such, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and understanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. *olOa on* rote jwev TroX-

i} &o/C£i elat TO a-yaOdv, rote Se

Koi oriye ol TQVTO jj-yovjucvoi *OVK* TOV

ayaflov *<j>dvai, paXa* yeXouuc, ova8i£ovrEC yap? on owe icr/iev TO d-ya^ov, Xcyovcri TraXtv a>c clSpfft" You know that,

to the vulgar, pleasure seems to be the highest good ; but to those, who are more elegant and ingenious, knowledge : but they, who entertain this latter opinion, can none of them declare what kind of knowledge it is, which is that highest and chiefest good, but are^necessitated at last to say, that it is the knowledge of good, very ridiculously: forasmuch as herein they do but run round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ignorant of this highest good, they talk to us at the same time, as knowing what it is. And thereupon

he adds, KaXcuv aju^ore^wv ovrcov, •yvaxrewc T£ *K.CLL* aXi)-g* . :aXXo /cat /caXXtov art rovro ijyou/*€voc avro, opawc 'ETrtcT-nf^v 8e *K.CU* aX^feav, aJcTrcp $<^c *-TE* /cat iJ]Li£v *vopi&iv opOov,* rfXiov Sf t]-y£icr0at ov/c o'p-c, ouro) *icalzvTavOa ayaOouSij fjilv* vojui^eiv aft^orspa opfloV, ct-yaOov Se *qy&iaOai &7TOT£pov avrwv OVK* opflov, aXX' ert /Ltet-

£ovo>c rrjv TOV ayafloi! c^cv *Ti^riov^* That though know ledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet he. that shall conclude the chief good to be something which transcends them both, will not .be mistaken. For as light, and sight, or the see ing faculty, may both of them rightly be said to be soliform things, or of kiu to the sun,

but neither of them to be the sun itself ; so knowledge and truth may likewise both of them be said to be